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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal with gold star and various unit citations, campaign 
medals and service medals.
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Abstract 
The need to effectively and efficiently provide emergency supplies and services is 
increasing all over the world. We investigate policy options: prepositioning 
supplemental resources, preemptive as well as phased deployment of assets, and 
surge of supplies and services. We hypothesize that there exists a correlation 
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between these policies and our disaster classification based on localization 
(dispersed or local) of the disaster and its speed of onset (slow or sudden). We 
believe that the creation of a matrix and designation of policies based on disaster 
type will facilitate the policy makers’ decision process. Exploring the efficacy of each 
policy option with respect to several crisis scenarios to assist policy makers to better 
prepare their disaster response is critical in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Response. 
Introduction 
In 2009 there were “335 natural disasters reported worldwide that killed 10,655 
persons, affected more than 119 million others, and caused over $41.3 billion in economic 
damages” (Vos, Rodriguez, Below, & Guha-Sapir, 2009).  The number of natural disasters 
reported between 1900 and 2007 has increased significantly and with it, the number of 
requests for aid and humanitarian assistance (see Figure 1).  While the trend in the number 
of disasters reported shows an increase, it is not clear that there has been a commensurate 
response in terms of preparedness.  The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) reports that of all funds used to support disaster operations, 90% are 
spent for response, whereas 10% are spent on preparedness activities and investments and 
risk reduction (A. Giegerich, personal communication, 2010).  The United Nations estimates 
that every dollar spent to prepare for a disaster saves seven dollars in disaster response 
(United Nations Human Development Program, 2007). 
Although the objective of all the organizations and agencies involved in humanitarian 
assistance is to reduce human suffering and casualties, the duration and severity of the 
human toll during a natural disaster is largely dependent upon the speed and scope of the 
response, which is often a function of the level of preparedness that has been established 
prior to the disaster event.  While there are no internationally agreed upon metrics by which 
to judge or measure the effectiveness of a response to a disaster, scholars working in the 
humanitarian and disaster response research area have found that improvement is 
desirable (Apte, 2009; Van Wassenhove,  2006). An effective and efficient humanitarian 
response depends “on the ability of logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at 
the site of a humanitarian relief effort” (Thomas, 2003).  In this research we focus on the 
response to a disaster area in the form of distributing supplies, and strategies that will 
enhance the effectiveness of such a response. 
 As part of our investigation, we will explore four policy options: (1) prepositioning 
supplemental resources in or near the incident location, (2) proactive deployment of assets 
in advance of a request, (3) phased deployment of assets and supplies, analogous to the 
“just in time” inventory control philosophy practiced by many commercial manufacturers, and 









Figure 1. Number of Disasters Reported from 1900–2007 
(UNEP/GRID, 2009) 
Literature Review 
One of the major issues in a response supply chain in case of a natural disaster is to 
coordinate the operations and relief inventories over a large number of stages, locations, 
and organizations. This has to be done while providing the emergency supplies and services 
to the affected population under extreme conditions. Decisions regarding the types of 
provisions that should be prepositioned, as well as their location, should be made well 
before a disaster strikes in order to provide quick response.  To some extent, without such a 
high level of uncertainty and an adverse environment, it is similar to the core question in 
supply chain management of coordinating activities and inventories over a spectrum of 
stages of the supply chain and facility locations of the inventory (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 
2009).  
In the private sector, it has been found that if each individual stage in a serial-system 
of the supply chain operates with a designated base stock policy with service guarantees, 
then the optimal safety stock strategy is to maintain inventory at certain key locations which 
results in separating the stages of the supply chain. This allows each stage to operate 
independently by minimizing the need for communication and coordination amongst players 
(Simpson, 1958; Graves & Willems, 2003). Models available in supply chain management 
literature are predominantly with unlimited capacity for storage. In cases where there is 
unlimited capacity, the amount of safety stock needed is less than the level needed with 
capacity constraint (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2009).  
Literature discussing strategic inventory placement under evolving or pre-determined 
forecasts (Graves & Schoenmeyr, 2008; Simpson, 1958) suggests policies for the optimal 
placement of safety stocks in a supply chain.  Graves and Willems (2002) study this problem 
accounting for uncertain as well as non-stationary demand.  This concept can be translated 
to the response supply chain due to the type of demand in a disaster response (Apte, 2009; 
Ergun, Heier, & Swann, 2008). There has been much more published work available with 
stationary demand as opposed to non-stationary demand.  Most of the non-stationary 
demand has been modeled as a Markov–modulated Poisson demand process (Chen & 
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Song, 2001; Graves & Abhyankar, 2001). One of the primary conclusions for safety stock 
with non-stationary demand is that an inter-phase optimal policy need not be the same as 
the intra-phase policy (Graves & Willems, 2002).  
In addition to the prepositioning of relief inventories, a disaster response may require 
the formulation of policies that require the expansion of warehouses, medical facilities, and 
temporary shelters, while infrastructure preparation may include the provision of airstrips 
and ramp space at existing airfields (Salmeron & Apte, 2010).  Regnier (2008) has explored 
the relationship between forecasting the time and location of a hurricane landfall and the 
amount of time necessary to evacuate a high-risk area; as the hurricane gets closer to land, 
the quality of the forecast increases; however, the time necessary to evacuate decreases. 
Though evacuation is not the focus of this research, the timing of the evacuation is an 
important factor when formulating logistics strategies in case of a disaster. 
Koavacs and Spens (2007) weigh the difference between traditional commercial 
logistics and humanitarian logistics.  With humanitarian logistics, it is imperative to go 
beyond the profitability of commercial logistics.  Within the domain of humanitarian logistics, 
suppliers have different motivations for participating, and customers are not generating 
voluntary demand and will hopefully not create a “repeat purchase.”  Thus, supply networks 
must take into account the lack of true demand; demand will be dictated by the relief 
agencies which are the primary actors within this framework.  Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of the agency to “push” the supplies to the disaster location in the immediate 
response phase, which is different from the commercial philosophy of pull-based demand.  
Humanitarian logistics focuses on getting the greatest volume of supplies to the points 
where they are needed, and there may be lessons learned in the commercial sector that 
could be used to improve the planning and execution of strategies that could be 
implemented during a disaster response.  
Disaster Life Cycles 
The life cycle of a disaster from the perspective of Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Response (HADR) is divided into three stages (see Figure 2): being prepared in the 
pre-disaster stage, response as the disaster strikes, and recovery in post-disaster (Van 
Wassenhove, 2006; Apte, 2009). In order to mitigate the effects of a disaster, one could 
draw on policies proven to be effective in the private sector (Van Wassenhove, 2006), as 
well as those in current use by the U.S. military, since many of these policies have been 





















Disaster preparedness is the first step in mitigating the adverse impacts of any 
unforeseen catastrophic event.  Preparedness on an individual level is defined by the 
creation of an escape and survival plan, as well as the procurement and storage of supplies 
that will enable an individual to act on the plan.  Preparedness on an organizational or 
institutional level translates to the planning and pre-establishment of adequate capacity and 
resources that enable efficient relief operations.  Prepositioning of war reserve and 
contingency stocks, such as that practiced by each of the U.S. Armed Services, has proven 
an effective means of increasing the speed of response to a conflict (Abell et al., 2000; 
Button, Gordon, Hoffman, Riposo, & Wilson, 2010; Hura & Robinson, 1991; McGarvey et al., 
2010). The private commercial sector, too, has been involved in prepositioning strategic 
safety stocks in supply chains with evolving forecasts (Graves &Schoenmeyr, 2008), 
capacity constraints (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2009), and non-stationary demands (Graves & 
Willems, 2002, 2008).   In addition to the prepositioning of supplies, the U.S. Armed 
Services have excess capacity in combat, combat support, and combat service support in 
the form of reserves and National Guard, as well as specialized capabilities needed for 
crossing rivers, opening ports, and disposing of hazardous and explosive materials.  
Disaster response is a function of the preparation that took place prior to the disaster 
event, as well as the coordination of available supplies and distribution capacity.  The first 
part of the response consists of gaining situational awareness of events and conditions on 
the ground in the disaster area through the collection of available information, and then 
using this information and awareness to generate an operational picture that will inform the 
nature, scale, and timing of the response.  The response itself is largely comprised of the 
tactical activities that must take place to move needed supplies to those parts of the disaster 
area that are in the most critical demand, given the available resources at hand.  
Disaster recovery consists of stabilizing the disaster area and improving the living 
and economic conditions of those affected by the catastrophic event.  The recovery phase 
will mean different things to different organizations. For the military, the recovery phase will 
likely signal the beginning of drawn-down or redeployment operations, whereby military 
personnel and equipment will be withdrawn and responsibility turned over to civil authorities. 
For non-governmental aid organizations, the recovery phase may consist of establishing 
semi-permanent camps, aid stations, or warehouses to shelter displaced persons, deliver 
critical services that cannot be provided by other civil authorities, and coordinate the storage 
and distribution of supplies that are otherwise unavailable or in short supply to the local 
population.  
Studying the life cycle of recent disasters offers insight into both short-term and long-
term consequences. They also provide us with numerous lessons to form effective 
strategies for mitigating future disasters. However, in order to formulate such strategies we 
need to understand disasters in terms of their speed and scope, especially since we believe 
they directly affect operational difficulty in preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Disaster Classification 
Disasters are often classified based on the speed of onset and the source or cause 
of the disaster (Ergun et al., 2008; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  However, in our research, we 
focus on four disaster scenarios that are combinations of the geographic dispersion of the 
disaster (dispersed or localized) and its speed of onset (slow or sudden) as discussed by 
Apte (2009) and described in Figure 3.  The disaster classification suggests that the level of 
difficulty in the logistics execution is less onerous in the case of localized, slow-onset 
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disasters (depicted in quadrant III of Figure 3), because there may be adequate lead time 
and local resources to prepare for the response. 
II: Dispersed and 
Slow Onset
I: Dispersed and 
Sudden Onset
III: Localized and 
Slow Onset








Figure 3. Classification of Disasters  
(Apte, 2009) 
Dispersed and sudden-onset disasters (depicted in quadrant I of Figure 3) tend to be 
the most catastrophic in humanitarian terms, because in this case, both a lack of warning 
and a large geographic region are affected.  The recent earthquake and tsunami that 
occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011, was both rapid in its onset and dispersed in terms of 
its destruction; the tsunami alone covered a 420 square mile area of coastline, with most of 
the destruction taking place within an hour of the earthquake (Hirschberg & Richardson, 
2011). 
Quadrant II describes a context where the onset is slow but the affected area is 
geographically dispersed.  When the disaster area consists of a large or scattered 
geographical area, it may take substantial planning, resource allocation, and coordination 
among the military, humanitarian organizations, local, federal, and perhaps even foreign 
government representatives. The 2009 avian flu epidemic is an example of a slow onset, 
geographically dispersed disaster involving multiple countries to respond to its effects. 
Although the numbers of people who have died from avian flu have been modest over the 
last five years, there remains a significant threat that the disease could mutate into an 
antibiotic-resistant strain that could eventually kill millions of people worldwide. The sudden-
onset disaster, even if localized (depicted in quadrant IV of Figure 3), creates operational 
difficulties that are greater than circumstances where the onset is slow, but less than if the 
catastrophe were both rapid in its onset and geographically dispersed. Sudden-onset 
disasters deny authorities and the public time to prepare for the consequences of the 
disaster event and therefore tend to exact a much higher human cost. 
The disasters with slow-onset provide time for humanitarian logisticians to plan and 
prepare for relief operations. A disaster that strikes suddenly can pose difficult problems for 
response since no organization—military or humanitarian—can fully prepare for every need 
that will emerge during such an event.  However, prepositioning strategies such as asset 
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placement, resource allocation, management of disaster relief inventory, and location of 
such warehouses may help. It is clear that whether the disaster is localized or dispersed 
over a large geographical area, will dictate the level of difficulty involved in disaster 
response. 
In all these situations, where disasters may be slow-onset or sudden-onset, localized 
or dispersed, pre-positioning seems to be the policy that will always be more effective and 
efficient in HADR. The utilization of pre-positioning in private, as well as public sector, 
suggests that we formulate logistics strategy based on this concept. 
Discussion 
The unpredictability of the timing of a disaster, as well as the scope of its human and 
material destruction, raises several serious questions for emergency planners and first 
responders. For example, how can a state of supply preparedness be established and 
maintained? How should adequate prepositioned disaster relief inventory be established 
and sustained over time to include the rotation of perishable stocks? How can information 
regarding the location, quantity, and condition of prepositioned inventory be shared and 
what effect would this information sharing have on the total investment of prepositioned 
stocks? Is prepositioning the best strategy for all types of disasters? How reliable are the 
potential supply lines if it is determined that supplies should be virtually stockpiled (that is, a 
detailed list or database of supplies by type and quantity is created and maintained, as well 
as reliable sources that can provide the supplies quickly)? Should supplies be sourced 
locally or from outside the disaster zone? Answers to these questions depend on the 
expected onset speed of the disaster, the volume and weight of supplies to be moved, the 
expected magnitude of humanitarian relief required, and the expected likelihood of a 
disaster in the area.  
The success of the military in using prepositioned stocks has developed interest in 
the prospect of using such a strategy to support operations other than war (Brown, Schank, 
Dahlman, & Lewis, 1997; Salmeron & Apte, 2010).  Prepositioning supplemental resources 
in or near the incident location most resembles the military practice of storing defense 
inventory ashore to be used in the event of a conflict; the Army-prepositioned stocks in 
Southwest Asia, as well as those in Korea, are good examples. An alternative to 
prepositioning would be the early deployment of assets in advance of a local government 
request.  For example, as federal government officials see a hurricane approaching the Gulf 
of Mexico, they could mobilize food, water, and temporary shelters and stage them close to, 
but not in, the expected disaster zone so that when these supplies are needed, the lead time 
necessary to deliver them is reduced. Phased deployment of assets refers to timing the 
delivery of inventory to a disaster area as it is needed and in the quantity in which it is 
needed. This disaster response is analogous to “just in time” inventory control practiced by 
commercial manufacturers, and has the advantage of not committing excess inventory to a 
specific region before knowing precise types and quantities of supplies needed.  Phased 
deployment also prevents the disaster zone from being inundated or saturated with inbound 
materiel that might otherwise reduce the overall effectiveness of the disaster response due 
to inadequate infrastructure or limitations in personnel, material handling equipment, storage 
space, or some combination of all three. 
A surge in transportation of manpower and equipment from locations outside the 
disaster area is a final alternative that, rather than relying on prepositioned physical 
inventory, plans for excess capacity to deliver personnel and materiel in case of an 
emergency; in this instance, the “prepositioning” is with respect to capacity rather than 
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inventory.  The organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster response 
(such as those relevant agencies within the Department of Defense, civil and military 
agencies, and participating Non-Government Organizations) face issues of information 
availability, interoperability in communications and equipment, coordination of specialized 
skill sets, and determination of which organization will lead specific phases of the operation 
which affect the ability to collaborate and preposition supplies. A preliminary look at the 
above-mentioned four strategies related to the life cycle of a disaster suggests the 





















Figure 4. Policies Related to Life Cycle of a Disaster 
Note. Figure 4 is adapted from Apte (2009). 
Conclusion 
The localized, slow-onset and natural disasters are at one end of the spectrum with 
respect to the level of difficulty for humanitarian logistics, whereas dispersed, sudden-onset 
disasters are at the other. Classification of disasters and the life cycle of a disaster are our 
basis for formulating which of the four policies should be used when. The conceptual models 
we plan to develop in this work will serve as the theoretical base for future empirical work 
investigating appropriate policy options for different classifications of disasters. We believe 
the proposed research will create a comprehensive understanding of strategies in logistics 
for HADR; recommend strategies in logistics that are appropriate to different types of 
disasters; and recommend strategies in logistics that are appropriate to specific regions of 
the world.  
Way Forward 
Utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods to include process analysis, cost 
analysis, and case studies, we will introduce four policy options to respond to a disaster or 
humanitarian relief effort, and explore the efficacy of each one against the backdrop of four 
different disaster scenarios. Policy options will be developed that correspond to classes of 
disaster and operational difficulty to improve the decision process of policy makers in terms 
of resource acquisition and deployment. We plan to pursue the following methodology to 
achieve this goal.  
We will expand upon our current review of the academic literature to identify work 
that has addressed inventory prepositioning in the public (to include defense) and private 
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sector. We will identify examples of four candidate logistics strategies—prepositioning 
supplemental resources in or near the incident location; deploying federal assets in advance 
of a state or local government request; phased deployment of assets, analogous to the “just 
in time” inventory control philosophy practiced by many manufacturers; and “surge” 
transportation of manpower and equipment from locations outside the disaster area—in the 
public and private sector.  We will evaluate logistics strategies within the context of the four 
types of disaster scenarios and develop policy recommendations. 
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